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Gouvernance et performances économiques

24 janvier 2017 - Dossiers

Mémoire de master 1 (2013/2014) – Professeur référent : Robert F. Owen 

Mémoire  

 Gouvernance et performances économiques : une approche économétrique

Compléments 

compléments cours
Normes de publication
doc recherche
comment élaborer une problématique

Bibliographie (notes) 

– Daron Acemoglu : A simple model of inefficient institution (2006) –

This paper develops a simple model of economic and political institutions that lead to poor aggregate economic performance. In the model economy, groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient because of three distinct mechanisms: (1) revenue extraction, (2) factor price manipulation and (3) political consolidation. In particular, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups. They may do so to reduce the demand for factors coming from other groups in the economy, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices. Finally, they may try to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite’s preferences over inefficient policies translate into inefficient economic institutions.

simple model of inefficient insitutions

– Avinash Dixit : Modes of economic governance (2003) – 

I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners’ dilemmas between pairs of players randomly selected from two large populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no official legal system of contract enforcement. I examine how profit–maximizing private intermediation can supply the information and enforcement. I obtain conditions under which private governance can improve upon no governance, and examine why it fails to achieve social optimality.

modes of economic governance

– Dixit : Getting the Properties Right to Secure Property Rights (2005) – 

We think of god economic institutions as those that provide security of property rights … But nothing is implied about the actual form that property rights should take.

Properties right

– Dixit : clubs with entrapment (2003) –

Adoption of new technologies or institutions often have network effects or positive externalities. But we often hear latre, less enthusiastic participants claim that they were trapped.

clubs with entrapment

– Géraldine FROGER : Gouvernance mondiale et développement durable (2003) –

Les cahiers du groupement d’intérêt scientifique pour l’étude de la mondialisation et du développement numéro 29 : développement durable – quelles dynamiques ?

dynamique gouvernance mondiale 1
dynamique gouvernance mondiale 2

– Idrees Khawaja : reforming institutions, where to beguin ? (2009) –

Institutions promote growth—this view now holds firm ground. The task then is to ‘engineer’ growth promoting institutions. Endogeneity characterises institutions, for example, groups enjoying political power influence economic institutions but political power itself is a function of wealth. The question then is: what to reform first?

reforming insitutions where to beguin

– Nicolas Meisel : L’insaisissable relation entre « bonne gouvernance » et développement (2008) – 

A l’aide d’une nouvelle base de données, nous montrons que si la « bonne gouvernance » semble corrélée au niveau de développement, elle n’est pas corrélée à la vitesse de développement. En identifiant les caractéristiques institutionnelles spécifiques des pays qui ont amorcé leur décollage économique, nous précisons les capacités de gouvernance stratégiques développées par ces pays : la « bonne gouvernance » ne ressort pas comme une priorité pour le décollage économique. Elle le devient dans un second temps, ainsi que l’ouverture des systèmes de régulation économique, sociale et politique lorsque, bénéficiant d’une croissance soutenue et prolongée, un pays cherche à converger avec les pays développés.

Lien

– Serge Raynal : gouvernance et développement durable (2009) –

L’espèce humaine a fait de la planète son jardin mais les jardiniers découvrent que leurs outils se retournent contre eux. L’histoire en est longue. L’inquiétude est toute récente. Il y a quinze millions d’années, un primate abandonnait à ses cousins le confort de la forêt profonde et tentait sa chance en terrain découvert.

gouvernance et développement durable

– Dani Rodrick : getting institution right (2004) –

A user’s guide to the recent literature on institutions and growth.

getting institutions right

– Dani Rodrick, Subramanian : Institutions rule – The primacy of institutions (2002) – 

We estimate the respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income levels around the world, using recently developed instruments for institutions and trade. Our results indicate that the quality of institutions trumps’ everything else. Once institutions are controlled for, measures of geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes, although they have a strong indirect effect by influencing the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters the income equation with the wrong’ (i.e., negative) sign, although trade too has a positive effect on institutional quality. We relate our results to recent literature, and where differences exist, trace their origins to choices on samples, specification, and instrumentation.

institutions rule

– Stiglitz : The private uses of public interests incentives and institutions (1998) –

Today, many of us look at the fundamental theorem not as a description of the world, but as an explication of the conditions under which a market equilibrium will be Pareto efficient. These conditions are quite strong. The importance of some of the more explicit assumptions-like the lack of externalities and the completeness of markets-has long been known. In the last two decades, we have explored much more seriously the consequences of the informational assumptions implicit in the belief that markets are efficient.

Private uses part 1
Private uses part 2